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The concept of ‘human rights’ has become a familiar one in recent decades.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was created in the wake of World War II to prevent future crimes against humanity, and it claims to protect the rights of all.  For example, Article 2 of the UDHR states that ‘[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’  However, sexual orientation is not mentioned in Article 2.  In 2004 the UN discussed but deferred explicit recognition of the human rights of lesbians and gay men (International Lesbian and Gay Association, 2004). 

Lesbian and gay human rights

Lesbian and gay communities, however, globally face oppression, discrimination, and laws that fail to protect their human rights.  For instance, not until 2003 did the United States Supreme Court repeal its 1986 Bowers vs. Hardwick decision, which had denied privacy rights to lesbians and gay men.  In some Muslim countries, such as Iran, the Islamic Shari'a laws ? describes sex between two people of the same sex as contravening divine will and punishable by death (International Lesbian and Gay Association, 2004).  Egyptian authorities used laws against “habitual debauchery” to imprison 60 gay men in May 2001 arrested with connection to their actual or perceived sexual orientation (International Lesbian and Gay Association, 2003). 

The UK has its own history of denying lesbians and gay men their human rights. Up until December 2003 there were no laws to specifically protect employees from sexual orientation based discrimination. Before January 2000 lesbians and gay men were prohibited from joining the army (Stonewall, 2004, see Belkin, 2001 for a discussion).  Additional human rights violations in the UK include the right to education, the right to have a family or the right to marry.  All of these are violations which the UDHR was written to address but which have persisted into the twenty-first century. Thus, British lesbians and gay men live under conditions where their human rights are not fully protected.  The present research examines if tolerance for this lack of protection is related to psychological dehumanization of lesbians and gay men by their heterosexual counterparts. 

Ellis (2002) found a significant correlation between attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, and a measure of support for lesbian and gay human rights.  Many of her respondents who endorsed such general statements as “a person’s sexual orientation should not block that person’s basic personal freedoms” (p.?) opposed more specific lesbian and gay human rights, such as familial, privacy, and educational rights.  Ellis, Kitzinger and Wilkinson (2002) attribute this ambivalence to an ethos which opposes explicit discrimination, but in which lesbians and gay men are still viewed negatively  (see also Ellis 2001a; Hegarty, Pratto &  Lemieux, 2004; Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001; Morrison & Morrison, 2002 for further studies of contemporary heterosexist ambivalence).  How is such ambivalence managed?  Ellis (1999, p. 11) argues that ‘the only argument which can be invoked to counter a human rights perspective, then, is to construct lesbians and gay men as not human’.  This study looks to see if this is the case.  Are gay and lesbian people denied human rights because they are viewed as less than human?

Primary and secondary emotions and dehumanization

Social psychologist Jacques-Phillipe Leyens and his colleagues argue that attributions of humanness are closely tied to attribution of emotions.  Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, and Gaunt (2000) argue that inter-group discrimination involves the ‘infrahumanizing’ of outgroups by denying them the essential traits of human beings. Leyens et al. (2000) describe primary emotions as those that can be attributed to both human beings and animals, have a quick onset, appear early in life, have a brief and unbidden duration.  Examples include joy, sadness and anger. In contrast secondary emotions are internally caused, invisible, cognitive, moral, less intense, longer in time and appear later in age.  Such emotions include sorrow and admiration and cannot be attributed to animals.  Leyens et al. (2000) predict that people more easily attribute secondary emotions to in-group members than to out-group members because secondary emotions are definitive of human essence They argue that the attribution of fewer secondary emotions to outgroups occurs even when secondary emotions are negative (e.g., jealousy).  

Several empirical studies, conducted by Leyens and his collaborators, support  this hypothesis. Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes and Demoulin (2001) found that both Canarian and Peninsular Spanish participants attributed more secondary emotions to their own group than to the other group. Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt and Demoulin (2002) used an Implicit Association Task (IAT) and found that Belgian participants were faster in responding to secondary emotions paired with ethnic in-group names and to primary emotions paired with ethnic out-group names, regardless of whether those emotions were positive or negative. Gaunt, Leyens, and Demoulin (2002) found new associations between the out-group and secondary emotions were better remembered than associations between the in-group and secondary emotions.  As conscious memories of schema-inconsistent information are typically stronger, these results further suggest that in-groups were associated with secondary emotions more than were out-groups. 

If heterosexuals do not view gay and lesbian people as equally human, as Ellis (2000) suggests, then it is likely that fewer secondary emotions will be attributed to gay men and lesbians by their heterosexual counterparts.  However, Leyens et al’s theory has been applied only with ethnic and national out-groups.  This study looks to see if their theory can also be applied to out-groups based on sexual orientation.





Participants. Nineteen male and 42 female undergraduates participated whose ages ranged from 17 to 29 years (mean age 22 years).  All identified as heterosexual.  Forty-one participants identified as white, 10 as non-white and 10 did not state their ethnicity.  Nine participants were withdrawn from the study; four had failed to complete the questionnaire and five had identified as gay, lesbian or bisexual.

Materials. The questionnaire contained three sections.  Section one presented four tables of emotions, taken from Paladino et al. (2002).  Each table included three positive secondary emotions (i.e. happiness, compassion, love), three negative secondary emotions (i.e. remorse, shame, fear), three positive primary emotions (i.e. lust, desire, pleasure), and three negative primary emotions (i.e. rage, fear, pain).  Participants were instructed to write a percentage next to each emotion to indicate the percentage of each social group that experience the emotion regularly.  Participants were asked to complete this task for four groups; heterosexual women, heterosexual men, gay men, and lesbians.  The order of presenting the emotions was fixed for all questionnaires.  Section two consisted of the Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Scale (Ellis et al., 2002).  This scale includes 25 items rated using 5-point  Likert scales.  High scores on this measure indicate support for lesbian and gay human rights. Section three assessed participants’ demographic information, including age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation and religion.  Strength of religious beliefs was assessed using a five-point scale with high scores indicating strong beliefs –Participants were also asked to report the number of people among their friends or family who were gay men or lesbians.





Support for lesbian and gay human rights.  Following Ellis et al. (2002) the appropriate items on the Human Rights Scale were reverse coded.  A mean score of all 25 items was calculated for each participant. The scale was internally consistent, Cronbach’s  = .88.   Relationships between demographic variables and support for lesbian and gay human rights were next assessed.  Men showed significantly less support for lesbian and gay human rights than did women, t (59) = 3.38, p = .001 (Ms = 3.56, 4.01 respectively). Strong religious beliefs were correlated with lower support for lesbian and gay human rights, r (58) = .38, p < .01. Support for lesbian and gay human rights was also correlated with previous contact both with lesbians and with gay men, r (59) = .31, p < .05, r (60) = .45, p < .01 respectively.  No significant relationships were found between average support for lesbian and gay human rights and age, nationality, ethnicity, and religion, all |r| <.26, all p >.05.  

Attributions of primary and secondary emotions.  Our first hypothesis was that participants would attribute more secondary emotions to heterosexual men and women than to gay men and lesbians.  A 2x2x2x2 analysis of variance was conducted with four within-subject variables; gender of target group (male vs. female), sexual identity of target group (gay/lesbian vs. heterosexual), emotion type (primary vs. secondary) and emotion valence (positive vs. negative). Several main effects and interactions were observed.  More emotions were attributed to women than to men, F (1, 60) = 24.21, p <.001, more primary than secondary emotions were attributed, F (1, 60) = 139.34, p <.001, and more positive than negative emotions were attributed, F (1, 60) = 63.67, p <.001.  

These main effects were qualified by several higher order interactions. Gender and sexual identity of target interacted, F (1, 60) = 44.68, p <.001, as did gender and emotion type, F (1, 60) = 91.07, p <.001, and sexual identity and emotion type, F (1, 60) = 23.84, p <.001.  Two three way interactions were observed; one involved gender, sexual identity and emotion type, F (1, 60) = 65.97, p <.001, and the other involved gender, emotion type and emotional evaluation, F (1, 60) = 27.46, p <.001.  Finally, a four way interaction involving all independent variables was observed, F (1, 60) = 20.02, p <.001.  No other main effects or interactions approached significance, all F < 2, all p >.16 (see Table 1).

Table 1:  Mean Percentage of Each Target Group Estimated to Possess Each Emotion Type.
												
Target Group Gender				Women			Men		
Target Group Sexual Identity		Straight	Lesbian	Straight 	Gay	
Primary Emotions
	Positive			72.7a		72.4 a		80.0b		75.9ab
	Negative			63.9 b		58.5 a		59.4 ab		61.6 ab
Secondary Emotions
	Positive			74.0c		69.1bc		52.5 a		66.8 b
	Negative			57.7 c		53.2 bc		43.3 a		52.0 b	
Note:  Means within a row that do not share a subscript are significantly different from each other.  

How do these results inform our hypotheses?  Using Tukey’s post hoc tests ( = .05) we further examined the four way interaction.  Leyens’ theory makes no firm prediction about the attribution of primary emotions to in-groups and out-groups.  However, primary positive emotions were attributed more to men than to women overall.  Negative primary emotions were attributed most to straight women, an intermediate amount to gay and straight men, and least to lesbians.   However, larger differences were observed with regard to secondary emotions.  Both positive and negative secondary emotions were both attributed most to straight women, than to lesbian and gay targets, and least of all to straight men.  
These findings fail to confirm Leyens’ theory that secondary emotions are attributed more to outgroups than to ingroups.  Note that participants attributed more secondary emotions to women of all sexual orientations than to men of all sexual orientations, and that most of our participants were female. Were they then using gender, rather than sexual identity, as a basis for in-group and out-group distinctions?   To examine this possibility we re-ran the analysis including participant gender as an additional independent variable.  Only in one case did participant gender interact with the findings reported above. A significant three-way interaction was observed between participant gender, target gender, and target sexual orientation, F (1, 59) = 5.21, p <.05.   Tukey’s post hoc tests revealed no differences between male and female participants overall attributions of emotions to lesbians and gay men.  However, women attributed significantly more emotions to straight women than to straight men overall (Ms = 68.6, 53.8 respectively), but among male participants this difference was not significant (Ms = 63.6, 58.7 respectively).  This interaction did not qualify the findings described earlier: both male and female participants attributed secondary emotions most to straight women (Ms = 62.3, 67.4 respectively), next to lesbians (Ms = 59.7, 61.8 respectively), next to gay men (Ms = 57.9, 60.1 respectively), and least to straight men (Ms = 50.1, 46.9 respectively). 

Attributions of primary and secondary emotions and lesbian and gay human rights.  Our second hypothesis was that support for lesbian and gay human rights would be positively correlated with attributions of secondary emotions to lesbians and gay men.  Correlations between support for lesbian and gay human rights and attributions of each emotion type are shown in Table 2.  

Table 2: Correlations between Attributions of Emotions and Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights. 
												
Target Group Gender				Women			Men		









All correlations were positive; persons who supported lesbian and gay human rights attributed more of all types of emotions to all groups.  However, these correlations only approached significance in four cases, all of which involved positive emotions.  It would be a better summary of these results to note that support for human rights were robustly correlated with greater attributions of positive emotion to both lesbians and gay men, rs = .36, .28, p  <.01, p < .03  respectively, than with attributions of secondary emotions to lesbians and gay men, r (61) = .248, .256, p  <.05, p < .06 respectively.  These findings do support the hypothesis that attributions of secondary emotions are tied to the denial of human rights, but more strongly support Ellis et al.’s (2002) interpretation of their scale as related to general attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. 
Discussion

This study found that secondary emotions were attributed more to straight women than to lesbian women and more to gay men than to straight men.  Furthermore attributions of secondary emotions to lesbians and gay men were not consistently correlated with support for lesbian and gay human rights.  These findings fail to confirm Leyens’ theory that attributions of secondary emotions are tied to the infrahumanization of outgroups. 

Instead, the results suggest that participants based their attributions of secondary emotions on gender stereotypes. Gender stereotypes are consensual beliefs about the attributes of men and women and are usually consensual among men and women.   Kelly and  Hutson-Comeaux (1999) found that (heterosexual) women are expected to be more expressive of interpersonally elicited emotions than (heterosexual) men, which would include the secondary emotions used here (e.g., compassion, shame). Stereotyping studies consistently find that gay men are attributed characteristics associated with heterosexual women, while lesbians are attributed characteristics associated with heterosexual men (Kite & Deaux 1987).   Heterosexual women may have been attributed more secondary emotions than lesbians, and straight men might have been attributed fewer secondary emotions than gay men, because those emotions were stereotyped according to heterosexual gender roles.  Interestingly, Viki and  Abrams (2003) also observed correlations between attributions of secondary emotions to women and endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. 

Not only our results, but also our methods differ from those of Leyens and his colleagues.  We made the gender of in-groups and out-groups explicit, while Leyens typically does not. Only in Paladino et al.’s studies (2002) where the stimuli consist of names of in-group and out-group members are participants given any clue about the gender of the targets they are judging. National stereotypes tend to be androcentric, confusing the attributes of men with the attributes of more general groups (Bem, 1993).  Thus, people attribute the same traits to national groups as to men in those national groups, while stereotyping women in all national groups primarily as women (Eagly & Kite, 1987).  The present study raises the issue of whether Leyens and his colleagues’ previous findings are not also influenced by androcentrism to an unacknowledged degree.  Our research shows that participants use primary and secondary emotions to attribute gender as well as to attribute human essence, and suggest that gendered representations of emotion must be given greater importance in attempts to use emotion ratings as measures of infrahumanization.   
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